New Shun 1730

So, under this premise, how can we improve the "standard of salt merchants" and achieve the point of "using the name of ticket salt to actually operate salt"?

Wu Jingzi added: "The direction of salt reform is nothing more than opening up salt permits and allowing small merchants to enter the market. So, salt reform itself is a matter of great concern in the world, and it will happen sooner or later."

"What we need to do is change without changing."

"The so-called change is to make those who say that salt reform is necessary speechless, and it has indeed changed."

"The so-called no change is that in the end, the people who control salt are still people like Brother Zheng, and they have not actually changed."

"Brother Zheng, do you know where the key to this 'change without changing' is?"

Zheng Yuxu has vaguely touched that key, but he can't find the starting point for a while.

He has recognized Wu Jingzi's idea, which is definitely correct. This idea is very novel, but very effective.

The key lies in how to turn this idea into reality?

He stood up and bowed to Wu Jingzi, saying earnestly: "Please enlighten me!"

Wu Jingzi said: "The key lies in the faraway places such as northern Chu, western Anhui, and Jiangxi."

"The call for salt reform has been very popular. I think Brother Zheng has read more of these articles. But..."

Speaking of this, Wu Jingzi smiled with some sarcasm.

"It's just that the people in Songjiang Prefecture didn't follow the shouting. They were busy making money. If those people were to enter the market, they would definitely point out an important loophole in these reform claims - do small salt merchants have the capital and ability to transport salt to farther southern Anhui and northern Chu?"

"If the ticket salt law means that as long as you pay money and get a ticket, you can sell it everywhere, will it cause salt near the salt fields to overflow, while no one will transport it far away from the salt fields?"

"If the ticket law is combined with the gang law, divided into different salt areas, the ticket of place A cannot be sold in place B, then what is the difference between this and gang salt? It's just that the money was originally paid when the tax was collected every year, and now it is paid when the ticket is sold. Can't Brother Zheng just buy all the tickets?"

"If there is no division of the salt area, as long as it is Huaibei, If the salt fields can be sold at will, who would be willing to go to far places? Do small capital and small merchants have the financial resources to go to southern Anhui and northern Chu? "

"If we cannot cover the remote areas of the salt fields, won't private salt still be rampant?"

"What the court wants is to crack down on private salt. But obviously, this only cracks down on private salt in Jiangsu and Henan, but aggravates private salt in Jiangxi, Hubei, and Anhui. This is the first. "

"Second, when small merchants enter the market, they don't mention whether they have the capital to transport to Hubei, western Anhui and other distant places. They only say that they carry 300 to 500 kilograms per draw. How to check? Is it easier to smuggle than a large ship? "

"Such a change can only make private salt in Jiangsu, Henan, and eastern Anhui converge, but it cannot reach Hubei and Jiangxi where private salt is really rampant. "

As the saying goes, hit the snake at its seven inches.

Wu Jingzi's words hit the seven inches of the court's salt policy reform.

If we talk about the people, then can the completely market-oriented salt reform benefit remote areas?

Merchants seek profits, how to ensure that merchants buy salt tickets from remote areas in the concept of salt industry?

If we don't talk about the people, don't raise the banner, talk about the reality, talk about salt tax and private salt.

Then, this change is equivalent to Lianghuai directly giving up the official salt market in Jiangxi, Hubei and western Anhui, and completely throwing it to private salt.

There is such a reason: small merchants are unable to afford the capital required for sales in remote areas in the concept of salt industry.

According to the salt policy reform plan that those people are clamoring for, the forty or fifty counties and prefectures covered by the entire Huaibei are all considered "Huaibei sales area".

You can enter the market with a minimum of 300 kilograms.

If you enter and buy a ticket, you can sell it in the entire Huaibei sales area.

Indeed, the effect is immediate, and private salt in the Lianghuai area can be instantly eliminated.

But what about the distance?

Under perfect market conditions, in theory, as long as the profit is enough, someone will definitely sell it.

But the question is whether this "perfect market condition" exists?

How long does it take for the official salt bought by individual merchants to be transported to Hubei? Is the capital sufficient? What is the profit?

Private salt already exists, and they are sold there. If they cannot sell the official salt and cannot get their money back, will they go there again?

The biggest difference between this era and later generations is precisely in the transportation cost and turnover cycle.

This is a problem.

The second problem is that another purpose of implementing the salt law and engaging in smuggling is collective transportation to facilitate the investigation of smuggling.

Now small merchants are allowed to enter the market, with 300 kilograms per ship and 500 kilograms per ship. They leave today and leave tomorrow. Will the smuggling fly away?

Can it be investigated?

The officials of Dashun did not understand too many economic terms, but it does not mean that they did not understand.

The idea of ​​this salt administration reform is a standard market competition idea.

There are four advantages listed.

The first benefit: the ticket dealers have less fees, so the salt price will be lower day by day, and the lower price can beat private.

The second benefit: the ticket dealers bring their capital, first pay taxes and then salt, and there is no longer the problem of tax arrears.

The third benefit: the ticket dealers act according to their ability, even if they do not have much capital, they are allowed to traffic, which will benefit the people.

The fourth benefit: merchants compete with each other, fearing that people will not buy their goods, so their salt must be pure and white, winning by quality, and the people will benefit.

That is, as long as the market operation is liberalized, not only will the salt eaten by the people become cheaper and cheaper, but under full competition, the salt dealers will not dare to pass off inferior salt as good salt, and the quality of salt will definitely be higher and higher.

This is the truth, and the officials' thinking seems to be correct.

But there are two issues that are not considered:

First, how to ensure that the merchant groups do not use capital to monopolize salt tickets? Rely on the court to interfere? Wouldn't that go against the guiding ideas of the reform?

How can the court interfere? If they give enough power, wouldn't it be a return to the old path of salt officials seeking personal gain? If they don't give enough power, how can they manage these large salt merchants with a total of tens of millions of taels?

Second, in places far away from salt production areas, do small vendors have the capital to undertake such long-distance transportation and turnover?

And for big merchants, why don't they sell in places where it is convenient to sell? Why don't they occupy the best market?

Who would take the initiative to think about the people and specifically grab salt tickets from places far away where transportation is inconvenient?

In good sales areas, everyone fights for it.

In bad sales areas, no one cares.

In places where everyone fights for it, there is vicious competition; in places where no one cares, private salt is rampant.

Of course, this may just be an excuse.

But this excuse can be used as a reason to bring out what the salt merchants really want.

What are these big salt merchants afraid of?

Are they afraid of selling salt tickets for money?

They are not short of money.

What they fear is that "three to five hundred kilograms can be undertaken and tickets can be purchased".

So, what does "doing filial and honest things in the name of imperial examinations" mean?

It is to raise the admission standards.

The reason is also very simple:

Can small merchants withstand more than a year of turnover?

Can they withstand the bankruptcy caused by the competition of private salt after it is transported?

They can't.

Once they can't withstand it, within three to five years, no one will sell salt in remote areas.

At that time, private salt will directly flood.

And the court wants to defeat private salt with official salt, so it has carried out such market-oriented reforms. Isn't this going in the wrong direction?

So, does the court need a big merchant to undertake these places that require long-term funds and capital investment?

To ensure the stability of official salt in areas far away from salt production areas? It won't be so that there will be too much to sell this year, and no one will come next year, and the people will be bland?

Yes.

If necessary, places with good profits, such as the surrounding areas of Huaibei Salt District, will be given to small capital; the most difficult places will be given to big capital?

Is this possible?

Since the ticket system has been changed, can I not do it? I can come and go freely. Why don't I grab the best sales areas and go to those troublesome areas?

So, is there a solution?

Of course there is.

Wu Jingzi's solution to Zheng Yuxu is divided into six steps.

Step 1: Be clear and directly oppose the salt administration reform. Even if the limelight has passed today, it will be raised again tomorrow.

Therefore, you must not oppose it openly, and you must absolutely support the salt administration reform.

Step 2: After supporting, mobilize public opinion through Confucian scholars controlled by salt merchants, and vigorously advocate the harm of small capital entering the market, especially directly pointing out that "it will affect the sales of official salt in Hubei and other places, and may make private salt more rampant."

Directly ask those who support the salt administration reform whether they have thought of this problem? How do you plan to change this problem?

Put forward all kinds of extreme possibilities and ask them how to solve these problems if they arise?

Do you dare to bet your head and sign a document like the missionaries and the Imperial Observatory in the past to guarantee that similar things will not happen? If it does happen, commit suicide to apologize?

Step 3: Propose a solution.

Small merchants have insufficient capital and are unable to complete the transportation in remote areas.

Then, this requires large merchants with sufficient capital to undertake the transportation and sale of salt in Hubei, western Anhui, Jiangxi and other places.

At the same time, small boats are easy to smuggle, while large ships are not easy to smuggle, because once they are checked, the cost is too high.

Small merchants will definitely work hard in places where it is easy to make money and easy to turn over, but leave places where it is not easy to turn over empty, which is also unreasonable.

The best way is to compensate those merchants who transport salt to remote areas.

How to compensate, in the way of "transporting far and compensating near", that is, according to the proportion, the salt from the near distance and the salt from the far distance reach a ratio, and the tickets are bundled and sold.

For example, in places like southern Jiangsu, everyone will definitely fight for it.

But it's okay, you can grab it, provided that you have to take on some remote areas such as western Anhui and northern Chu.

For example, 500,000 catties of tickets for southern Jiangsu must be bundled with 200,000 catties of tickets for western Anhui.

Otherwise, who will guarantee that the tickets for southern Jiangsu are fair? How can the fourth nephew of the third nephew of the second uncle who manages the salt tickets ensure that they do not get the tickets from southern Jiangsu first?

Step 4: Strike while the iron is hot.

Once the tickets are bundled and sold, small merchants will be even more unable to do it.

At this time, the "capital verification for tickets" is proposed, that is, the capital reaches a certain amount, proving that you have the ability to turn around, before you can buy salt tickets.

You need to take out enough principal to prove your ability. However, ordinary merchants have difficulty in turnover and high interest rates, and they have to take out principal as a deposit. How can they do it?

At this time, the dual purpose of capital verification has been achieved.

Only with sufficient capital can you be qualified to do it; if the capital is insufficient, you will definitely not be able to do it. If the capital is half sufficient and half insufficient, you can directly withdraw from the market after taking out the deposit, and you can't turn around.

Step 5: Raise the entry qualification line.

The minimum amount for transferring tickets will be raised to between 2,000 old notes and 5,000 old notes, which is about 700,000 to 1.4 million catties of salt.

In this way, small, medium, and large but not too large individual merchants with capital below 100,000 taels were completely blocked.

It's not just the salt money, but also the freight, turnover, etc. Without 100,000 taels, it's impossible to do business with 5,000 taels.

Once the merchants with less than 100,000 taels are squeezed out, the rest will be easy.

Step 6: The old general contractors sit down and divide the monopoly area.

The original big salt merchants get together to discuss and negotiate their respective quotas and areas, and no one should take more. They control the situation together.

In this way, even if the salt administration is reformed and changed to the ticket salt system, the big salt merchants still hold the salt tickets.

However, the original salt ticket was owned by my grandfather, passed on to my father, and then to me.

Now, it is sold publicly every year, and the process is repeated. My salt ticket has nothing to do with my father. I bought it with my own money. If you have money, you can buy it.

After completing all these six steps, the purpose of "changing but not changing" and "doing filial and honest things in the name of imperial examinations" has been achieved.

Has it been changed?

It has been changed.

Has the Salt Gang Law been abolished?

It has been abolished.

Has it been changed to the Salt Ticket Law?

It has been done.

Is the salt ticket no longer inherited?

Yes, it is no longer inherited.

Is it sold publicly every year?

It is sold publicly.

Then, is there any difference from before?

If you want to say yes, there is.

It seems that there is none.

The big salt merchants, relying on the capital in their hands, can still control the monopoly of salt even if the ticket law is changed, as long as they play the key card of "small merchants cannot transport salt to western Anhui and northern Chu due to insufficient capital" and increase the ticket purchase qualification quota.

At that time, wait until the storm is over.

Whatever happens, it will be.

Before, I sold the salt permit.

Now I sell tickets.

Before, it was a yearly tax package.

Now it is an annual auction.

Before, I directly inherited my father's salt permit.

Now I inherit my father's money and use it to buy salt tickets.

In this way, those who call for salt policy reform will be speechless, and the purpose of salt merchants opposing reform can be achieved.

Because the essence of their opposition to reform is that the reform touches their interests, not because they are sensitive to the word "reform" and feel uncomfortable when they hear it, and they oppose it for the sake of opposition. As long as it does not touch the old interests, change it, and change it hard.